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The State-level Burden of the Trade War: 
Interactions between the Market Facilitation Program and Tariffs
Edward J. Balistreri, Wendong Zhang, and John Beghin
ebalistr@iastate.edu; wdzhang@iastate.edu; beghin@unl.edu
THE COSTS and benefits of the trade war are unevenly distributed across the United 
States. Looking at the raw impact on 
commodity prices, such as soybeans, 
we know that it disproportionately 
affects farmers in the Midwest. The 
Phase One Trade agreement between 
the United States and China promises 
substantial relief; however, we question 
if the Phase One targets are realistic 
(See “The Phase One Trade Deal: 
Projections and Implications” by Chad 
Hart and Lee Schulz in this issue). Thus, 
it is important to consider just how 
much is at stake for different states and 
the nation as a whole.
Measuring the impacts of the tariffs 
on any particular group is challenging 
because there are a lot of moving parts. 
While the tariffs depress the price of 
US pork, the outbreak of African Swine 
Fever in China supports meat demand 
and prices on US markets.1 
Our job is to isolate the specific 
impacts of independent policy choices. 
We have, for example, already measured 
the impact of the tariffs on Iowa 
independent of other policies and 
unexpected events (like the outbreak 
of African Swine Fever in China).2 
However, there are some policies that, 
while they are independent choices, 
directly compensate particular groups 
adversely impacted by the tariffs. The 
Market Facilitation Program (MFP) 
is one such policy that compensates 
farmers across the United States for the 
adverse impacts of the tariffs on farm 
income.
Ongoing research measuring the 
state-level impacts of the tariffs in 
combination with cash transfers under 
the MFP find a dramatic alteration of 
the geographic distribution of the costs 
of the trade war. This is not particularly 
surprising, as the intent of the policy is 
to compensate farmers. What might be 
surprising is that many Midwest states, 
including Iowa, actually experience 
net welfare gains as MFP payments 
totally offset the impact of the tariffs. 
We carefully consider the full effects of 
the tariffs in terms of both commodity 
price impacts and tariff revenues 
1 See, for example, “Impact of African Swine Fever on US and World Commodity Markets” in the fall 2019 Agricultural Policy Review.
2 In Balistreri et al. (2018) we consider the impact of the tariff increases on Iowa as of August 2018.
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collected, and we are careful to consider 
that MFP payments have to (at least 
implicitly) be funded through foregone 
budget opportunities, which indicates 
an escalation of the costs of the tariffs 
on states that receive little or no MFP 
payments, like California.
The Trump Administration 
implemented the Market Facilitation 
Program (MFP) in 2018 and 2019 
to assist farmers impacted by the 
trade war. In total, the administration 
authorized $28 billion of aid to farmers 
hurt by the tariffs, and is expected to 
distribute about $23 billion of these $28 
billion. This aid shifts the state-level 
burden of the trade war because the 
MFP payments have a real cost in terms 
of budget opportunities. Considering 
the state-level burden requires a 
consideration of the trade equilibrium, 
the distribution of tariff revenues, 
and the net distribution of assistance 
proceeds. 
The administration has disbursed 
the 2018 payments, about $8.5 billion, 
and two tranches of 2019 payments.3 
The total estimated payments for 2019 
(three tranches) is around $14.3 billion 
based on Glauber’s (2019) estimates. 
While the 2018 payments were 
commodity based (and notoriously 
failed to compensate corn growers 
by offering $1.65/bushel for soybean 
growers and $.01/bushel for corn 
growers), the 2019 payments are based 
on acres, vary across counties, and, in 
general, offer higher per-acre payments 
than the 2018 MFP payments. Criteria 
used to compute losses from the trade 
retaliations were also more lax. Both 
the 2018 and 2019 MFP payments 
concentrate heavily on Midwest states, 
reflecting the political influence of these 
states’ rural communities. Glauber 
(2019) provides a breakdown of MFP 
payments by state, which we use as the 
base of our analysis.
We use a general-equilibrium 
modeling system for the US economy 
that provides computationally efficient 
state-level resolution with consistent 
(funded) interstate transfers that 
allows us to explore the distribution 
of state-level burdens under plausible 
alternative assumptions. We construct 
a set of detailed social accounts for all 
50 states and the District of Columbia 
using the open-source WiNDC system.4 
These data are dynamically aggregated 
to seven regions plus a focus state 
for calibrating the multi-region US 
model for analysis, which gives us 50 
different models with small regional 
dimensionality (eight). We test for, 
and find, negligible approximation 
errors related to this computational 
strategy. Our scenarios include the 
introduction of international price 
impacts and consistent tariff revenues 
from a GTAPinGAMS global model and 
the introduction of the MFP interstate 
transfer payments.5
We make the most transparent 
assumption about the funding and 
distribution of MFP payments and 
the distribution of tariff payments. 
Specifically, we assume that tariff 
revenues are distributed lump-sum 
according to benchmark income 
shares across states; and, we assume 
that the MFP is funded lump-sum 
according to benchmark income shares. 
The transfers do not act through 
distortionary policy instruments. Our 
3 A third tranche is supposed to take place in early 2020.
4 The Wisconsin National Data Consortium (WiNDC) is led by Thomas F. Rutherford at the University of Wisconsin: https://windc.wisc.edu/.
5 The GTAPinGAMS model used to establish international prices and tariff revenues is from Li, Balistreri, and Zhang (2019).
Figure 1. State-level trade war burden with and without 2019 MFP compen-
sation ($B EV) and 2019 MPF payments ($B).
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transparent cash transfer approach 
avoids the issue of how the MFP is 
actually funded (potentially through 
increases in distortionary taxes 
and government debt), which could 
substantially alter the distribution and 
overall cost of the MFP. Our approach 
gives us a first-pass consideration 
of the state-level burden-shifting 
aspects of the MFP independent of the 
other distributional consequences of 
government finance.
Table 1 and figure 1 show that 
many Midwest states experience 
net welfare gains, as MFP payments 
totally offset the incidence of tariff 
retaliation on the state economy. 
Specifically, Iowa gains $878 million, 
North Dakota $532 million, Nebraska 
$532 million, Kansas $475 million, 
South Dakota $347 million, Arkansas 
$216 million, and Minnesota gains 
$140 million. These “winner” states, 
in general, disproportionately rely on 
their agricultural sector for income, and 
received substantial MFP payments. 
Other states, like Illinois, do not 
quite experience a full offsetting of the 
incidence of tariffs, but still greatly 
benefit from the MFP payments. 
Notably, Illinois has a net welfare loss 
of $1.029 billion, despite receiving the 
second-largest MFP payments ($1.476 
billion) due to its large loss from the 
tariff war ($1.936 billion); however, the 
MFP payments still abate the loss by 
$900 million. 
At the opposite end, Texas and 
California experience large welfare 
losses regardless of MFP payments. 
California’s welfare losses are 
substantially exacerbated by the 
MFP—a -$8.239 billion welfare 
impact under the 2019 MFP payments 
compared to -$6.255 billion under the 
trade dispute alone. California’s MFP 
payments are small ($106 million) 
compared to the size of its agriculture 
sector, and California’s large income 



















































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Trade War Burden and MFP Impacts by State ($B)
terms of funding the MFP. Thus, net MFP 
payments for California are -$1.931 
billion, which substantially contributes 
to exacerbated welfare losses. The 
story in Texas is more nuanced—MFP 
payments are large ($1.297 billion), 
but as the second-largest state, Texas 
has a large burden in terms of funding 
the MFP. On net, Texas receives a 
relatively small transfer of $108 million. 
The MFP thus slightly mitigates the 
cost of the trade dispute for Texas—a 
-$4.200 billion welfare impact under 
the 2019 MFP payments compared 
to -$4.312 under the trade dispute 
alone. In percent terms, the District of 
Columbia, Hawaii, and Virginia face a 
similar situation as California—limited 
agriculture and MFP payments, but 
bearing their share of funding the MFP.
Our results also reveal important 
political economy insights, both 
across and within states. Because 
the MFP payments are strongly tied 
to agricultural production, farmers, 
ranchers, landowners, and rural 
communities receive the bulk of the 
benefits. At the same time, the burden 
of tax revenues falls on all citizens, and 
thus more populous urban states and 
urban constituents with more residents 
continued on page 10
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New Farm Bill, New Decisions, New Tools
Alejandro Plastina
plastina@iastate.edu
THE AGRICULTURE Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 Farm Bill) introduced major changes to 
the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) 
and the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
programs, and Iowa State University 
Extension and Outreach has developed 
new tools to help farmers and 
landowners make informed decisions 
about these programs.
ARC/PLC 
The 2018 Farm Bill re-authorized the 
ARC and PLC programs for 2019–2023. 
Farm operators still have to elect one 
program and enroll annually in ARC/
PLC; however, Congress introduced 
several tweaks to add flexibility and 
improve the probability of receiving 
higher payments for producers affected 
by low commodity prices or crop 
failures. 
ARC is offered at the county level 
(ARC-CO) and at the individual level 
(ARC-IC), and ARC program payments 
are triggered by actual revenue dipping 
below the revenue guarantee. ARC-
CO uses historical county yields and 
national cash prices to determine 
the revenue guarantee. ARC-IC uses 
farm-specific historical yields across 
all farms enrolled in ARC-IC in the 
state operated by the same farmer and 
national cash prices to determine the 
revenue guarantee for that farmer. The 
revenue guaruntees in both programs 
amount to 86% of their respective five-
year Olympic average revenue. While, at 
first, ARC-IC seems to be more relevant 
to managing risk at the farm level than 
does ARC-CO, the payment acres in the 
ARC-IC program are only 65% of the 
farm’s total covered commodity base 
acres, while ARC-CO payment acres 
are 85% of the farm- and commodity-
specific base acres. Furthermore, 
while ARC-CO is a commodity-specific 
program (in the sense that corn base 
acres in a farm can be enrolled in ARC-
CO while soybean base acres on the 
same farm can be enrolled in PLC), ARC-
IC averages out all sources of revenue 
across all covered commodities and all 
ARC-IC enrolled farms in the state to 
calculate the revenue guarantee and 
the actual revenue. From 2015 to 2018, 
about 98% of all corn and soybean base 
acres in Iowa were elected into ARC-
CO. PLC payments are triggered when 
annual commodity prices fall below 
specific reference prices.
One of the major changes 
introduced by the 2018 Farm Bill 
is shortening the period in which a 
farm is tied to a particular program. 
Farmers can now switch programs for a 
particular farm before the end of the life 
of the farm bill. A farm can be elected 
into ARC or PLC for 2019 and 2020 
before the March 15, 2020, deadline. 
However, starting in 2021, program 
election will be an annual choice. 
Another major tweak is the one-
time opportunity in 2020 for farmland 
owners (not tenants) to update farm 
PLC yields for payment years 2020–
2023. As producers can now switch 
programs during the life of the farm bill, 
updating the PLC program yields before 
the September 30, 2020 deadline may 
prove beneficial later on. The choice to 
update yields is one that owners and 
operators should consider closely. 
Minor changes introduced to 
program payment formulas that tend to 
increase the probability of occurrence 
and the amount of program payments 
if market conditions improve through 
time, include the use of higher “plug” 
yields, the use of trend-adjusted yield 
factors, and a reference price “escalator.” 
The calculation of the ARC-CO 
revenue guarantee involves the five-
year Olympic average county yield. 
In the 2014 formula, any year when 
county yields were below 70% of the 
transitional yield, the latter would be 
used as a “plug” yield instead of the 
actual yield. In the 2018 formula, the 
new “plug” yield is equivalent to 80% 
of the transitional yield. Furthermore, 
the 2018 formula uses county-specific 
trend-adjusted yield factors (similar to 
the ones used in crop insurance) instead 
of observed county yields in the revenue 
guarantee calculation, potentially 
resulting in “inflated” guarantees for 
some counties. 
The calculation of the ARC-CO 
revenue guarantee also involves the 
five-year Olympic average price for 
each commodity. The 2018 formula 
allows the use of the Effective Reference 
Price (ERP) as a price “plug” in years 
when the commodity price is lower 
than the ERP. In turn, the ERP is the 
highest of the 2014 Statutory Reference 
Price ($3.70 for corn and $8.40 for 
soybeans) and 85% of the five-year 
Olympic average price, up to 115% of 
the Statutory Reference Price ($4.26 for 
corn and $9.66 for soybeans). Starting 
in 2019, the ERP is effectively the new 
triggering price point for PLC payments. 
Although current price projections for 
2020–2023 seem to suggest that ERP 
will equal the Statutory Reference Price 
over the life of the 2018 Farm Bill, the 
tweaking of the price formulas allows 
for a built-in reference price “escalator” 
mechanism for whenever prices shoot 
up.
The 2018 Farm Bill left the crop 
insurance program mostly unchanged, 
continued on page 9
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The Phase One Trade Deal: Projections and Implications
Chad Hart and Lee Schulz
chart@iastate.edu; lschulz@iastate.edu
THERE HAVE been a number of agricultural market movers (issues that change the direction 
and intensity of price moves) over 
the past year; however, most of these 
movers cancel each other out. Weather 
problems limited supplies and pushed 
prices higher, but the trade disputes 
and tariffs limited usage and offset the 
price impacts. With the passage of the 
USMCA and the signing of trade deals 
with China and Japan over the past few 
months, there is some positive news on 
the trade front. However, as the market 
reaction to the US-China trade deal 
signing indicates, agricultural markets 
are not interested in the political deals, 
but in actually seeing trade flows 
change due to these deals.
International trade has grown 
into a lucrative component for US 
agriculture. As figure 1 shows, the 
values of agricultural product exports 
and imports have more than doubled 
since 2000. While crop prices have 
dropped dramatically since 2012 and 
livestock prices have retreated from 
2014, US agricultural export values 
have remained fairly firm, holding at 
$130–$140 billion over the past five 
years. While imports have also risen 
significantly over the past couple of 
decades, agriculture remains one of 
the few sectors in our economy where 
the United States holds a trade surplus. 
The recent trade disagreements have 
diminished that surplus, but overall 
trade values remain robust.
The progress on multiple trade 
deals signals the potential for significant 
shifts in agricultural trade. The USMCA 
and Japan agreements concentrate on 
solidifying existing trade flows, rather 
than significantly expanding trade 
continued on page 8
opportunities. Canada, Mexico, and 
Japan have been major agricultural 
markets for the United States for quite 
some time. These new deals maintain 
and protect those relationships, with 
the prospects for continued, but limited, 
growth. The China deal, on the other 
hand, has the potential to radically 
change global trade flows. To see why, it 
is important to understand the current 
agricultural export picture. 
Figure 2 breaks down US 
agricultural export values by market 
destination. The blue line is the value 
of agricultural exports to countries 
where the United States has a free 
trade agreement. Canada and Mexico 
represent roughly two-thirds of that 
volume. The red line is the value of 
agricultural exports to China. Prior to 
2000, China was a very small market 
for US agriculture; however, trade 
between the United States and China 
grew significantly and quickly after, 
peaking at roughly $25 billion in 2012. 
Between 2012 and 2017, US agricultural 
export values to China slowly declined, 
mainly due to the general reduction in 
agricultural prices. Trade disagreements 
between the United States and China 
and the imposition of tariffs led to the 
steep drop in export values in 2018. 
We did see, however, some recovery 
in agricultural trade flows to China 
even before the signing of the China 
trade deal. The green line is the value 
of agricultural exports to the rest of 
the world, and shows that we rely 
on significant trade flows outside of 
China and free trade partners. To put it 
another way, agricultural trade is more 
complicated than the “Big 3” markets of 
China, Canada, and Mexico.
The Phase One deal alters the Figure 1. US agricultural trade flows, 1970–present.
Source: USDA-FAS.
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Implications of a US Carbon Tax on Agricultural Markets 
and GHG Emissions from Land-use Change
Jerome Dumortier and Amani Elobeid
jdumorti@iupui.edu; amani@iastate.edu
RISING CONCERNS about climate change have led to the introduction of carbon policies 
around the globe. In January 2019, the 
Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend 
(EICD) Act of 2019 was introduced 
to the House of Representatives.1 The 
act proposes a carbon tax of $15/
ton of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(t-1 CO2-e) starting in calendar year 
2019, and covers entities such as 
refineries, coal mines, and natural gas 
producers. Adjusted for inflation, the tax 
increases $10 each year and is subject 
to adjustments given the under- or 
over-achievement of annual emission 
reduction targets. The tax ceases if 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are 
at or below 10% of the 2016 GHG 
emissions. 
There are two important provisions 
of the carbon tax proposal to increase 
its support among stakeholders. First, 
the EICD Act of 2019 is designed as a 
revenue-neutral carbon tax with the 
creation of a Carbon Dividend Trust 
Fund. The tax revenue is distributed 
back to eligible individuals (i.e., US 
citizens and lawful residents) in the 
form of a lump-sum payment. Second, 
there is a carbon border fee adjustment 
mechanism to adjust the cost of 
imported fuels and carbon-intensive 
products covered under the legislation. 
The purpose of the border adjustment 
is to avoid carbon leakage by switching 
to carbon-intensive imports whose 
production is not subject to a carbon 
tax. Beyond the lump-sum payments 
and border adjustments, there are 
two tax exemptions specifically 
for agriculture. First, fuels and its 
derivatives are not taxable if used 
on-farm for farming purposes. For 
example, diesel fuel purchased for farm 
machinery is not subject to the tax. 
Second, there is no carbon tax on non-
fossil fuel emissions from agriculture 
such as from livestock and fertilizer 
application—an important exemption 
because agriculture contributes 9% of 
total US GHG emissions (EPA 2019).
To assess the impacts of the carbon 
tax on agricultural producers in the 
United States and on international 
commodity markets, we use the CARD 
Model—a well-established global 
agricultural outlook model—to evaluate 
a baseline without a carbon tax and a 
scenario that includes a carbon tax.2 We 
can attribute the difference between 
the baseline and our scenarios in 
terms of commodity prices, land-use, 
trade patterns, and GHG emissions 
to the various levels of the carbon 
tax. We adjust the cost of production 
of US agriculture, which we model 
through the different components of 
the Producer Price Index (PPI). An 
increase in the PPI from the carbon tax 
will affect crop and livestock producers. 
Adjustments in production quantities 
(i.e., crop area and livestock herd) 
allow us to assess the global effects of 
the carbon tax. We should note that we 
use a simulation model to evaluate a 
reasonable pathway as opposed to using 
historical data in an econometric model; 
thus, there is inherent uncertainty about 
the actual evolution of agricultural 
markets including land-use, prices, 
and emissions. We only analyze one 
aspect of the proposed legislation 
(i.e., agricultural cost of production 
and trade), and do not include other 
emission sources such as manufacturing 
or transportation.
Over the ten-year projection period, 
the carbon tax ranges from $15 to 
$105/t-1 CO2-e. We observe the highest 
increase in production cost at the end 
of the projection for corn, cotton, and 
sorghum with increases of 16.4%, 
15.5%, and 14.6% above the baseline, 
respectively; and, the lowest increase in 
production costs are for wheat (12.5%) 
and soybeans (11.9%). Oats, rice, sugar 
beets, barley, and peanuts experience 
a cost of production increase in a 
relative narrow band between 13.2% 
and 13.9%. The magnitude of the cost 
increase is mostly due to increases in 
natural gas prices, which is an input in 
the production of fertilizer. 
Although farmers face higher 
production cost, an increase in 
commodity prices and a decrease in 
crop area lessens the effect on crop 
profitability (i.e., market net return) 
(see figure 1). Corn, cotton, and 
sorghum prices increase between 
1.0% and 1.6%, but the price increases 
for other commodities are below 1%. 
Although we see an increase in the 
cost of production by up to 16.4% for 
some commodities, the decreases in 
net return range from 3.2% (peanuts) 
to 8.1% (wheat). A crop area that is 
essentially unchanged from the baseline 
explains the high decrease in net 
returns for wheat. Thus, the increase 
in the production cost translates more 
directly into a net return decrease 
1  https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/763
2 Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University
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compared to other crops.  
Under the act, overall crop area 
in the United States declines by 0.4%. 
Barley, oats, and sorghum decrease 
between 2.3% and 2.4%, whereas corn 
and soybeans decrease by 0.9% and 
0.1%, respectively, in the same scenario. 
The carbon tax mostly impacts fertilizer 
and, thus, makes using marginal 
cropland unprofitable. US corn and 
sorghum exports decrease by 4.9% 
and 3.4%, respectively. The decrease 
in soybean exports is smaller than for 
corn at 0.8%. The largest change in US 
exports is observed for sunflower seeds 
with a decrease of 7.5%. 
The decrease in US exports 
for major commodities is in part 
compensated by an increase in exports 
from large crop-producing countries. 
Argentina increases its exports of 
barley, corn, and sorghum by 0.2%, 
1.3%, and 1.0%, respectively. As 
previously mentioned, we see a slight 
increase in US wheat production and a 
0.5% decrease in wheat exports from 
Argentina. Brazil also increases its 
exports of corn and soybeans by 5.2% 
and 0.6%, respectively.    
Dumortier et al. (2012) shows 
that a tax on US cattle emissions would 
increase net GHG emissions globally. 
Thus, the implementation of a carbon 
tax that affects agriculture in the 
United States warrants attention to 
avoid similar effects. Our results show 
that an increase in carbon emissions 
triggered by land-use change is 
negligible and represents less than 0.6% 
of US emissions in 2017 (EPA 2019). 
Emissions from land-use change in 
other countries, especially Brazil, partly 
offset the reduction in US emissions 
from land-use change. Focusing on 
emissions from changes in cropland 
and pasture (due to changes in livestock 
inventory), the maximum emissions in 
the EICD scenario are 35.37 Tg CO2-e. 
Using minimum and mean carbon 
coefficients, the emissions are 5.95 and 
16.22 Tg CO2-e, respectively.
Given the expected negative effects 
of climate change on US agriculture in 
terms of net revenue loss triggered by 
declining yields, the carbon tax may 
be a more cost-effective policy. This of 
course goes back to the discussion on 
the expected (and highly uncertain) 
Figure 1. Commodity price changes (1a) and changes in net return (1b) under the EICD act.
damages associated with climate change 
and how those future expenditures 
compare to costs incurred today to 
avoid rising temperatures. The answer 
to that question is beyond the scope of 
our analysis.
continued on page 10
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agricultural trade landscape—China 
has agreed to specific targets for 
agricultural purchases for this year and 
next year. The deal uses 2017 as the 
base year for trade, and, as figures 2 and 
3 show, Chinese agricultural purchases 
totaled roughly $19.5 billion that year. 
For 2020, China agreed to purchase 
$12.5 billion more in agricultural 
products than it did in the base year, 
which puts 2020 US agricultural 
exports to China at $32 billion (other 
publications report higher amounts, 
but they are including forestry and ag-
related products, such as infant formula 
and pet food). For 2021, the agreement 
is $19.5 billion more than the base 
year—$39 billion in agricultural sales 
to China. These two targets alone 
guarantee a significant surge in sales 
to China, far eclipsing the record sales 
from 2012. The text of the deal also 
includes a statement indicating that the 
growth in US agricultural exports to 
China set in these two years is projected 
to continue through 2025. Figure 3 
outlines those projections. If projections 
from the deal are accurate, agricultural 
trade with China will grow to exceed 
what the United States currently ships 
to its free trade partners or to the rest of 
the world.
Traders are sorting through three 
big questions right now. One, will China 
follow through on these commitments 
over the next two years and what mix 
of products will they choose? Two, 
how secure are those projections for 
continued agricultural trade growth 
beyond 2021? Three, what happens to 
our other markets as this agreement 
is fulfilled? We feel that it is likely 
that China will meet the value targets 
for the next two years as the African 
Swine Fever outbreak there has created 
a significant protein gap for China. 
The deal contains language easing 
The Phase One Trade Deal: Projections 
and Implications
continued from page 5
trade rules for meats between the 
two countries, so it makes sense that 
China would expand meat purchases 
from the United States, fulfilling two 
objectives at once—filling in the protein 
gap and meeting trade targets. While 
Figure 2. Export market segments.
Source: USDA-FAS.
Figure 3. Projected export flows under the Phase One deal.
soybeans were the largest portion of 
previous agricultural sales to China, we 
expect meat, especially pork, to take 
the leading spots in our future sales to 
China. Thus, the product mix will shift, 
moving to more value-added products, 
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but explicitly allows the use of cover 
crops as a “good farming practice,” and 
indicates that cover crop termination 
does not affect the insurability of a 
subsequently planted insurable crop 
when terminated according to USDA 
guidelines (or those of an agricultural 
expert).
New Decisions, New Tools
The ISU Extension and Outreach Farm 
Management Team has been educating 
farmers and landowners about the new 
decisions required by the 2018 Farm 
Bill using the following seven-step 
program, which is centered around two 
new decision tools:
1. Find your farm’s base acres and 
existing PLC yields on the FSA 156-EZ 
form.
2. Evaluate whether to update the 
PLC program yield using 2013–2017 
crop production evidence and Ag 
Decision Maker File A1-35 (http://bit.
ly/ADMFileA135). The information 
required to use this tool is actual farm 
yields for 2013–2017 on a planted acre 
basis and the existing PLC yield. Form 
CCC-867 must be signed with USDA 
New Farm Bill, New Decisions, New 
Tools
continued from page 4
Farm Service Agency offices to complete 
the process by September 30, 2020. The 
update will become effective for the 
2020 crop. 
3. Guesstimate your county yields for 
both the 2019 and 2020 crops.
4. Project the national cash price 
averages for both the 2019/20 and 
2020/21 marketing years.
5. Place this information into an 
ARC/PLC Payment Calculator. 
The ISU calculator (http://bit.ly/
ARCPLCCalculator) includes links to 
USDA and FAPRI price projections and 
uses reported and projected prices 
from USDA Farm Service Agency 
and Risk Management Agency to 
project payments per base acre (after 
sequestration) for ARC-CO and PLC. 
6. Compare the potential ARC-CO vs. 
PLC payments for both 2019 and 2020 
crops by crop and FSA farm number.
7. Elect and enroll each farm for two 
years (2019 and 2020) in the ARC-CO 
and/or PLC program by crop by Farm 
Service Agency farm number at USDA 
Farm Service Agency offices by March 
15, 2020.
A major drawback of most ARC/
PLC calculators is that they lack the 
capabilities to evaluate the potential 
payments from ARC-IC. The reason 
behind the omission is the wealth of 
farm-specific information required to 
implement the calculations, especially 
when farmers operate multiple FSA 
farms. ARC-IC should definitely be 
considered by farmers who experienced 
prevented planting in 2019, and those 
at risk of experiencing it in 2020 (such 
as farmers in Northwest Iowa), because 
the program considers the resulting 
revenue on those acres equal to zero, 
and the payment will equal the whole 
ARC-IC revenue guarantee, up to a cap, 
if prevented planting was declared 
in the entire farm. The University of 
Illinois has recently released the 2019 
ARC-IC Payment Calculator, which can 
be accessed at https://farmdoc.illinois.
edu/fast-tools/arc-co-plc-model, along 
with an explanatory video available at 
http://bit.ly/ARCICVideo. 
Information on past ARC-CO and 
PLC payments by counties in Iowa 
is available in the CARD website 
at http://bit.ly/ARCPLCbyCounty. 
More information about the 2018 
Farm Bill is available at http://bit.ly/
ExtensionFarmBill. 
which helps China hit the dollar value 
targets.
Sales beyond 2021 are not locked 
in place. The agreement only states 
that both countries currently think 
the trade flows would continue to 
develop at the same pace as the first 
two years, implying gains of $7 billion 
per year. If the projections hold, they 
imply significant shifts in global trade 
flows—US agriculture will become 
even more reliant on Chinese demand. 
A large concern is what will happen 
to our other markets—this deal will 
likely crowd some of them out. China 
has agreed to buy more agricultural 
products, but that does not mean we 
can add that value to total exports. In 
fact, we are currently already seeing 
the potential for crowding out. Over 
the past few months China has re-
established itself as the top market for 
US soybeans. As China has moved back 
in, however, numerous other markets 
have reduced US soybean imports. Sales 
to the European Union, Mexico, Japan, 
Indonesia, South Korea, and Canada 
have fallen. With trade, there can be 
significant slippage—gains in one area 
are often offset by losses elsewhere. 
In this case, forcing sales to China will 
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bear higher costs of raising these tax 
revenues. It is also interesting to note 
that while most of the “winner” states 
are red states that voted for President 
Trump in the 2016 election, the net 
welfare effect for key battleground 
“purple” states such as Michigan, Ohio, 
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania remain 
The State-level Burden of the Trade 
War: Interactions between the Market 
Facilitation Program and Tariffs
continued from page 3
negative. 
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ISU Land Value Survey Results
CARD economist Wendong Zhang 
conducts the annual Iowa State 
University Land Value Survey every 
November. The 2019 results show the 
statewide value of an acre of farmland 
is now estimated to be $7,432, which 
represents an increase of 2.3 percent, or 
$168, since 2018. The $7,432 per acre 
estimate, and 2.3 percent increase in 
value, represents a statewide average 
of low-, medium-, and high-quality 
farmland. As Zhang noted, the increase 
just barely outpaced inflation. A press 
release is available at bit.ly/LVSPR.
Farm Owners Make Small Increases 
in Conservation
Alejandro Plastina and Wendong Zhang 
were recently involved in a study 
that shows Iowa farmers have made 
small increases in the adoption of 
conservation practices since 2012, and 
that ongoing trends in land ownership 
Also Available from CARD
and management are likely barriers to 
a number of conservation practices. A 
press release is available at 
bit.ly/IFTOS106.
Media Contacts
Every year, CARD economists are 
contacted hundreds of times by the 
media for their insights on current 
economic issues. You can see what they 
had to say, and how their research is 
being utilized, at  bit.ly/AllContacts.
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